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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
MARK DOUGLAS PRIDEAUX, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
Case No. 20020814-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction of one count each of 
criminal homicide, murder, a first degree felony, and possession, 
purchase, transfer, or ownership of a dangerous weapon by a 
restricted person, a second degree felony (R. 2-4). This court 
has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to the pourover 
provision of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (1999) (R. 332). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did defense counsel render ineffective assistance of 
counsel by eliciting testimony that defendant was on parole at 
the time he shot the victim, where that testimony served a valid 
tactical purpose? 
2. Did defense counsel render ineffective assistance of 
counsel where, at the close of the State's evidence, when the 
record contained competent evidence of all elements of possession 
or use of a firearm by a restricted person, defense counsel did 
not move for a directed verdict? 
In reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
this Court must determine whether trial counsel's performance was 
deficient and, if so, whether the deficient performance 
prejudiced defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
687 (1984); State v. Oliver, 820 P.2d 474, 478 (Utah App. 1991). 
This claim presents a question of law, reviewed on the record of 
the underlying trial. See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, M 
16-17, 12 P.3d 92. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 (Supp. 2000), governing 
possession of dangerous weapons by certain persons, provides in 
relevant part: 
(1) For purposes of this section: 
(a) A Category I restricted person is a 
person who: 
(ii) is on probation or parole for any 
felony[.] 
(2) A Category I restricted person who 
purchases, transfers, possesses, uses, or 
otherwise has under his custody or control: 
(a) any firearm is guilty of a second 
degree felony[.] 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with one count each of murder, a first 
degree felony, and possession, purchase, transfer, or ownership 
of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a second degree 
felony (R. 2-4). After a preliminary hearing, defendant was 
bound over for trial (R. 49). A jury convicted him as charged 
(R. 266-67). The trial court sentenced defendant to five years 
to life in the Utah State Prison on the first degree felony and 
one to fifteen years on the second degree felony (R, 299-301). 
The court ordered the terms to run consecutively to each other 
and to the term defendant was currently serving (Id.). The court 
also denied credit for time served, ordered restitution of 
$6886.43 to the victim's family, and imposed a fine of $5550 plus 
interest (Id.). Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 
303-04). 
Nine months later, defendant filed a motion for a rule 23B 
remand on the ground that counsel had failed to investigate and 
call a witness. This Court granted a remand to develop a record 
on the allegation (R. 354-68, 360). Following a hearing, the 
trial court determined that defense counsel had not rendered 
ineffective assistance of counsel on that claim (R. 413-17). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
An Underlying Tension 
Vanessa Martinez was pregnant with Christopher Velasquez's 
son when she had a brief romantic relationship with defendant (R. 
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338: 369). Two or three weeks prior to the events giving rise to 
this case, she told Christopher about the affair. The baby was 
almost five months old at the time (Id. at 278, 369). 
Christopher confronted defendant, the two had a verbal fight, and 
then, the matter seemingly resolved, the two went off drinking 
together (R. 338: 371; R. 339: 427). 
Christopher1s Birthday Party 
Christopher Velasquez, the victim, celebrated his birthday 
on January 12, 2001, by hosting a party for his friends, most of 
whom were members of a gang called VLT (R. 337: 140, 182). 
Quantities of beer and methamphetamine were consumed at the party 
(Id^ at 161, 185; R. 339: 415, 418, 438, 485-86, 497). Several 
partygoers packed handguns (R. 337: 134, 139, 177, 179, 188, 219 
R. 338: 240, 281; R. 339: 417). Sometime after midnight, eight 
or nine members of a gang called Dope Boy Posse showed up at the 
party (R. 337: 133). An altercation broke out between members of 
the two gangs, and guns were drawn (Id. at 218; R. 338: 240, 281; 
R. 339: 416, 489). One witness testified that Christopher 
announced, "You guys can't do this here. This is my son's house 
. . . Go outside" (R. 338: 282). The disputants went outside. 
As the Dope Boy Posse members left the scene, they fired shots 
from the street (R. 337: 140-41, 187). VLT returned fire (R. 337 
at 187). 
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Seeking Revenge 
Seeking revenge, the VLT members, including both Christopher 
and defendant, piled out of the apartment and into their waiting 
vehicles and set off in search of the Dope Boy Posse (R. 337: 
145, 167, 190; R. 339: 418). After about an hour of unsuccessful 
searching, with cell phone calls going back and forth between the 
VLT members, the three vehicles all met briefly at a Food-4-Less 
parking lot in West Valley City (R. 337: 143, 145, 147, 190; R. 
339: 421). Defendant was driving an SUV; Christopher was sitting 
in the back seat (R. 337: 145, 189). The three vehicles then 
proceeded to a dead end street, where two VLT members got out "to 
use the bathroom" (R. 337: 151-52, 192, R. 339: 424). One 
immediately returned to his seat in the back of a van, while the 
other remained outside, standing between the van and a white 
Thunderbird (R. 337: 192-93). Adrenalin was running high (R. 
338: 239). 
The Shooting 
Christopher and defendant got out of the SUV (R. 337: 151, 
153-54, 192; R. 339: 424). Defendant was talking to Christopher, 
who was holding his hands up, palms out in front of him as if to 
catch something (R. 337: 193, R. 339: 425). One witness, sitting 
in the Thunderbird, testified that Christopher''s stance suggested 
to him that >Nthey were going to get in a boxing match" (R. 339: 
425). He further testified: "[I]t looked like they were going to 
fight and they were walking towards each other. So I looked 
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over. And as I did that, I saw [defendant] step back a little 
bit and pull out a gun" (Id. at 426). 
Two other witnesses corroborated that it was defendant who 
was holding the gun when the shots that killed Christopher were 
fired (R. 337: 155, 179, 197). l The first shot hit Christopher 
in the wrist, shattering his watch, and then entered his chest, 
damaging his heart and lung (R. 338: 346-47; R. 339: 426, 428). 
Three more shots quickly followed (R. 337: 194).2 Christopher 
began to run away, stumbled, got up, and staggered to a nearby 
home. After pounding once on the front door, Christopher 
collapsed on the porch. He died where he fell, of multiple 
gunshot wounds to the chest, left arm, and hip (R. 337: 155, 195, 
201; R. 338: 258, 263, 266, 356; R. 339: 428-29). 
Defendant returned to his vehicle and fled the scene of the 
murder. The other two vehicles and their occupants also 
immediately drove off (R. 339: 429). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant argues that his counsel was ineffective because he 
elicited testimony from a detective that defendant was on parole 
1
 The only other person out of a vehicle when the shooting 
occurred did not have a gun and was "using the bathroom" at the 
time. His cousin quickly jumped out of the van to haul him to 
safety (R. 337: 195, 197) 
2
 Detectives found four 9mm casings on the scene (R. 338: 
298). One witness to the shooting also testified that he saw 
defendant at the birthday party with a 9mm "baby Glock" handgun 
(R. 339: 416-17). 
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at the time he murdered Christopher Velasquez. Absent this 
testimony, he asserts the evidence would have been insufficient 
to convict him of possession or use of a firearm by a restricted 
person. This argument fails on the deficient performance prong 
of the ineffectiveness test because his counsel had a sound 
strategic reason, related to the pending first degree murder 
charge, for introducing the testimony. 
Defendant also argues that his counsel was ineffective for 
failing to move for a directed verdict on the possession of a 
firearm charge. He contends that the detective's testimony was 
inadmissible because it was not the "best evidence" of 
defendant's status as a parolee. Absent a written document, he 
contends the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction 
for possession or use of a firearm by a restricted person. 
Defendant cites to no rule of evidence to support this 
proposition. In any event, the detective's testimony that 
defendant was on parole at the time of the murder, combined with 
documentary proof of a 1995 felony conviction, provided the jury 
with a sufficient basis upon which to conclude that defendant was 
a restricted person within the meaning of the applicable statute. 
No more was necessary to survive a directed verdict. Because 
failure of counsel to make a futile objection cannot constitute 
ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant's claim fails. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
TRIAL COUNSEL DID NOT RENDER 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
WHEN HE ELICITED TESTIMONY THAT 
DEFENDANT WAS ON PAROLE AT THE TIME 
HE SHOT CHRISTOPHER VELASQUEZ 
BECAUSE THAT TESTIMONY SERVED A 
VALID TACTICAL PURPOSE 
On appeal, defendant has abandoned the ineffective 
assistance claim that he asserted in his rule 23B motion. 
Instead, he argues that his trial counsel performed deficiently 
because, lacking any valid purpose, he elicited a statement from 
a detective that defendant was on parole at the time he shot 
Christopher Velasquez (Br. of Aplt. at 8-9). Defendant argues 
that he was prejudiced because, absent the testimony, no evidence 
would have established that he was a "category I restricted 
person/' a necessary element of the statute forbidding a 
restricted person from possessing or using a firearm. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-10-503(2) (a). Thus, absent the testimony, he 
argues, the evidence would have been insufficient as a matter of 
law to support a conviction for possession or use of a firearm by 
a restricted person (Br. of Aplt. at 9). 3 
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, 
defendant must demonstrate that his counsel's performance was so 
deficient as to fall below an objective standard of 
3
 Defendant's appeal challenges only his second degree 
felony conviction for possession or use of a firearm. He nowhere 
contests the correctness of his conviction for murder. 
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reasonableness and that, but for the deficient performance, a 
reasonable probability existed that the outcome of the trial 
would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 694 (1984); State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186-87 (Utah 
1990). Defendant's claim fails on the deficient performance 
prong of the ineffectiveness test. 
When reviewing trial counsel's work to assess deficient 
performance, "a[n appellate] court must indulge a strong 
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of 
reasonable professional assistance." State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 
681, 685 (Utah 1997)(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). "If a 
rational basis for counsel's performance can be articulated [this 
Court] will assume counsel acted competently." State v. 
Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 468 (Utah App. 1993). Thus, "an 
ineffective assistance claim succeeds only when no conceivable 
legitimate tactic or strategy can be surmised from counsel's 
actions." Id. 
Here, defense counsel's questioning arose in a context that 
bespeaks a rational trial strategy. The State had called Troy 
Johnson, a West Valley City homicide detective, to testify. On 
direct examination, Johnson described interviewing defendant two 
days after the murder (R. 338: 376). Meeting with defendant, who 
had been arrested and held in Logan, Johnson asked him his name. 
Defendant replied, "William Taylor" (Id. at 377). Following a 
Miranda warning, Johnson questioned defendant about his name. In 
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response, defendant inquired who the detective thought he was. 
When Johnson surmised he was Mark Prideaux, defendant admitted 
his identity (Id. at 378). Defendant also stated that although 
he attended Christopher's birthday party, he left immediately 
after shots were exchanged with the rival gang members and went 
to Ogden (Id. at 37 9). He denied being part of the group that 
searched for the Dope Boy Posse (Id.). 
On cross examination, seeking to dispel the inference that 
defendant gave a false name to the officer in order to avoid 
apprehension for the murder of Christopher Velasquez, defense 
counsel elicited an alternative explanation for defendant's 
behavior. Through a series of leading questions, counsel 
established that defendant had been on parole for a narcotics 
conviction, that he had absconded, and that Adult Probation and 
Parole had issued a warrant for his arrest (Id. at 383). This 
information gave the jury a basis upon which to believe both that 
defendant had nothing to do with Christopher's murder and that 
defendant had an entirely independent motive to lie to the police 
about his identity. Thus, by eliciting information about 
defendant's parole status and, in the process, admitting to an 
element of a second degree felony, defense counsel attempted to 
render acquittal of the more serious, first degree felony more 
likely. Such a decision reflects sound trial strategy, which 
this Court should not second-guess on appeal. See Taylor, 947 
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P.2d at 685; Tennyson, 850 P.2d at 468. Defendant, therefore, 
has not demonstrated that his counsel performed deficiently. 
Moreover, defendant also has not demonstrated any prejudice 
flowing from his counsel's eliciting his status as a parolee. 
"To show prejudice under the second component of the 
[ineffectiveness] test, a defendant must proffer sufficient 
evidence to support a^ reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different.'" Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 
522 (Utah 1994)(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). 
Here, defendant erroneously assumes that had he not elicited 
defendant's status as a parolee, the State would not have 
subsequently introduced such evidence.4 The record speaks to the 
contrary. On redirect examination, immediately after defense 
counsel elicited testimony of defendant's parole status, the 
State offered defendant's conviction for possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to distribute, a second degree 
felony (Id. at 385; R. 232 at addendum A). The State plainly 
offered this exhibit as foundation for the testimony that 
defendant had just introduced. Had defendant not first 
introduced testimony of his parole status for an independent 
strategic reason, the State was certainly prepared to do so for 
reasons of its own. Where defendant himself negated the need for 
4
 Defendant does not contest that he was on parole at the 
time, but only that the State should have borne the burden of 
adducing that fact. 
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the State to produce the evidence by adducing it first himself, 
he cannot now be heard to complain that the State did not carry 
its burden. More importantly, he has failed to show that the 
State would not have adduced the evidence of his parole status if 
he had not done it first. Defendant, therefore, has not met his 
burden of demonstrating prejudice. For this additional reason, 
his ineffective assistance claim fails. 
POINT TWO 
COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT 
MOVING FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT AT THE 
CLOSE OF THE STATE'S CASE BECAUSE AT 
THAT JUNCTURE THE RECORD CONTAINED 
COMPETENT EVIDENCE OF ALL ELEMENTS OF 
POSSESSION OR USE OF A FIREARM BY A 
RESTRICTED PERSON 
Defendant also argues that his counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance by not moving for a directed verdict at the close of 
the State's evidence (Br. of Aplt. at 9). He contends that the 
detective's testimony that defendant was on parole was 
inadmissible because it was not the "best evidence" of 
defendant's status as a parolee (Id. at 9-10). Absent a written 
document attesting to defendant's parole status, he asserts that 
the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for 
possession or use of a firearm by a restricted person (Id. at 
10) . 
Defendant does not cite to any provision of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence to support his contention that the detective's 
testimony was inadmissible. Instead, he relies wholly on a case 
-12-
decided under rules of evidence not argued or applicable here. 
See State v. Peterson, 560 P.2d 1387, 1390 (Utah 1977) (decided 
under old Utah Rules of Evidence 20 and 21). Even assuming 
arguendo, as stated in Peterson, that u[t]he best evidence of a 
conviction of a crime is the record of that conviction, and not 
by recollection testimony," id. (footnote omitted), it does not 
follow that defendant's parole status can only be proven by a 
written document attesting to that fact. 
Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction "[wjhere 
there is any evidence, including reasonable inferences that can 
be drawn from it, from which findings of all the elements of the 
crime can be made beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Gardner, 
789 P.2d 273, 285 (Utah 1989). A reviewing court will reverse a 
criminal conviction on insufficiency grounds only when the 
evidence is so lacking that "reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt" that defendant committed the 
crime. State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983), 
superceded on other grounds, State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 
1987). 
Here, defendant himself, for strategic purposes, adduced 
testimonial evidence that he was on parole for a felony (Id. at 
383). The State bolstered that testimony by introducing the 
underlying documentary evidence that defendant had been convicted 
of a felony in 1995 (R. 338: 385). With this record evidence 
before it, the jury, as exclusive judge of both the weight of the 
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evidence and its credibility, could reasonably believe that 
defendant was on parole at the time of the murder and, therefore, 
qualified as a Category I restricted person within the meaning of 
Utah Code Ann. §76-10-503 (2) (e) . State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 
984 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted) . Thus, had defendant moved 
for directed verdict, it would have been denied. The law is 
well-settled that NN>the failure of counsel to make motions or 
objections which would be futile if raised does not constitute 
ineffective assistance of counsel.'" Codianna v. Morris, 660 
P.2d 1101, 1109 (Utah 1983)(quoting State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 
56, 58 (Utah 1982)). Because defense counsel did not perform 
deficiently by not moving for directed verdict and because 
defendant has not shown that he would have prevailed on the 
motion, his ineffectiveness claim fails. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's 
convictions. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this cx{? day of August, 2004. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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